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Abstract: This article investigates food security and well-being in the context of 
“development-forced displacement” in Ethiopia. In the lower Omo, a large hydroelectric dam 
and plantation schemes have forced people to cede communal lands to the state and business 
speculators, and indigenous communities have been targeted for resettlement in new 
consolidated villages. The authors carried out a food access survey in new villages and in 
communities not yet subjected to villagization and complemented this with ethnographic 
research carried out over a period of four years. The results of the two methodological 
approaches were inconsistent. The survey data suggest that household food access was poor 
in both places but better in villagization sites than in the other communities. The 
ethnographic research, however, suggests that village settlers were unable to feed themselves 
from the irrigated plots they were allotted and were therefore dependent on food aid. They 
spoke of indignity, bodily discomfort, and the severance of meaningful social relations. This 
article discusses the contrast between the information generated by the different research 
methods and asks how this tension relates to two major narratives about development: 
development as a process through which the state actualizes a national dream, and 
development as a process that creates affluence for some by impoverishing others.  
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It is unsettling. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, some two hundred million 
people were displaced by development projects worldwide, forced into leaving their homes 
for somewhere new (Cernea 2009). For those who have not experienced such things, 
understanding the experience of displacement is challenging. In this study we use qualitative 
and quantitative approaches to investigate the experiences of people displaced by one 
development project in Ethiopia. In our study in the lower Omo, household survey and 
ethnographic data appear at first to tell very different stories: people living in resettlement 
sites, who were largely dependent on food aid at the time of our research, reported less 
intense experiences of food insecurity than those in communities reliant on their own farms 
and herds. Ethnography, on the other hand, showed that people in the new villages found life 
much harder there than in their former homes. They experienced a profound disruption: their 
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sense of well-being suffered, and their confidence in their ability to feed themselves in the 
future was diminished.  
How can these two contrasting images be reconciled? And how do they relate to the 
major narratives that surround dam and plantation development projects in Africa—
development as a process through which a beleaguered state redeems itself and actualizes a 
national dream, or development as a euphemism for a form of violent, primitive accumulation 
that creates affluence for some by impoverishing others? As Abbink (2012) has noted, these 
narratives seem to be incommensurable: there is a tendency to focus either on the interests of 
the nation-state or those of local communities.  
In this article we investigate how this polarization of focus is possible by analyzing 
the case of river basin development and social engineering in the lower Omo. We begin by 
acknowledging that research may privilege one or another narrative by focusing on a specific 
level of analysis, the nation-state or the local community. Further, the methods that scholars 
use may also speak more clearly to one narrative over another: metrics of economic 
productivity or food security may resonate more strongly with narratives of state 
development partly because they are the currencies by which such development is 
conventionally measured. Ethnographic work, on the other hand, can uncover alternative 
systems of value that are not easily converted into the terms used by outsiders. It can also 
shed light on forms of livelihood and sociality for which surveys are ill-suited. Without 
ethnography we would have found it difficult to recognize the inappropriate assumptions 
built into the food security questionnaire employed in this study.  
Equally important is the body of literature that informs the interpretation of data. In 
the case of the lower Omo, the social science literature on resettlement is particularly 
relevant. Systematic study of resettled communities, as opposed to the more settled 
communities that have constituted the traditional focus of anthropologists, may be traced to 
Elizabeth Colson’s work in Zambia, which began the late 1950s. Her studies of resettlement 
associated with the Kariba dam were among the first to consider the social impacts of 
displacement for entire communities and to theorize about the processes of rupture that 
massive resettlement schemes entailed (Colson 1971). As the number of people displaced by 
dam and infrastructure development schemes grew over the course of the twentieth century, a 
large body of literature accumulated on the phenomenon of resettlement (McDowell 1996; de 
Wet 2006). “Development-induced displacement” is sometimes used as a synonym for 
resettlement, but the absence of any meaningful consultation prior to the implementation of 
most such schemes means that these situations may be more accurately described as 
“development-forced displacement.” As Cernea has noted, “‘induced’ is not an appropriate 
term for a process that is determined by fiat, decided and planned out in advance” (cited by 
Oliver-Smith 2010:2).  
 For our purposes, programs of “development-forced displacement” may be usefully 
divided into three types. The first type, villagization, involves moving people who live in 
dispersed settlements into large, government-designed villages. Such programs of village 
regrouping, or forcing people to move into “model villages,” were employed both by colonial 
administrations, for example in Egypt (Mitchell 1988), and by post-colonial states, for 
example in Tanzania (Ndagala 1982). Rarely did these programs go according to plan. In 
Rhodesia (Zambia), a policy of moving rural communities into amalgamated settlements was 
abandoned after it resulted in famine and food shortages in 1909 (Kay 1967). In Ethiopia, the 
Derg military government proposed to villagize the entire rural population as part of a 
program of agricultural collectivization in the late 1970s (A. Pankhurst 1992). Although the 
policy was changed after the famine of 1984, the communities that had been subjected to 
villagization experienced social disruption, obstacles to efficient livestock management, and 
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hazards related to increased population density—for example increased risks of diarrheal 
disease (H. Pankhurst 1992; Taddesse 2002).  
 Another type of resettlement is based on the premise that moving people from areas 
of higher to lower population density will help prevent famine, as it makes possible more 
efficient use of underutilized lands. In Ethiopia, at least a million people were resettled on 
this basis between 1980 and 2010. The lands in question were invariably occupied already by 
people for whom the arrival of newcomers was a shock, and return migration was not 
uncommon (A. Pankhurst 1991, 2009). Placed in historical perspective, these programs can 
be seen as part of a longer process of state-making in Ethiopia, involving the political 
incorporation of the southern lowlands by peoples from the Christian highlands in the 
north—they represent one of the major continuities in the history of the Ethiopian state and 
its relationship to the peoples on its periphery (Donham & James 1986; Markakis 2011).  
The third type of resettlement involves both displacement and changes to land tenure 
and ecological circumstances brought about by infrastructure projects such as dams, 
highways, and irrigation schemes. In Ethiopia, the earliest major scheme of this kind 
occurred in the Awash Valley in the northeast of the country, where, beginning in the 1950s, 
a series of hydroelectric dams was built to provide electricity for Addis Ababa and to 
facilitate the irrigation of new cotton and sugar plantations (Ayalew & Getachew 2009). 
These projects served the interests of the state and of investors by providing them with access 
to large amounts of resources that were used by the peoples of the region, but that had 
previously remained outside of national accounts (Behnke & Kerven 2013). They raised 
major challenges for Afar and Oromo pastoralists who had used the floodplains of the Awash 
for dry season grazing. Kloos (1982) estimated that the irrigation schemes displaced twenty 
thousand people, who at the same time faced heightened competition for resources with the 
estimated 150,000 farm laborers, mostly migrants from the highlands, who settled near the 
plantations. When rains failed in 1973, the result was famine for many among the Afar and 
Oromo who no longer had any fall-back options.  
What is happening currently in the lower Omo Valley combines elements of all three 
of the types of displacement described above, and poses risks to food security at least as great 
as those created by the Awash projects. The scheme in the lower Omo was planned and 
executed by the current regime in Ethiopia in collaboration with the Italian engineering firm 
Salini, international financiers and a variety of investors who sought to profit from sugar and 
cotton estates irrigated by the waters of the Omo.1 To get a sense of the human impacts of 
this scheme, we designed a study that would (1) compare food access in villagization sites to 
food access in communities that had not yet been subject to resettlement, and (2) investigate 
the impacts of ongoing changes on well-being as locally understood. Food access is taken to 
mean the ability to acquire sufficient food at a given time (Maxwell & Smith 1992). This is 
one component of food security, which refers to a state in which there is a low risk of food 
shortage due to poverty, “crop failure, natural or other disasters” (United Nations 1975:14). 
Food security may itself be considered as a component of the larger domain of well-being, 
which implies the experience of pleasure, or partaking in what is good in life. Well-being is 
often associated with participation in meaningful daily routines (Weisner 2009); its opposite, 
ill-being, refers to suffering, isolation, and disruption (Narayan et al. 2000). 
The combination of methods employed in this study reflects our backgrounds as 
anthropologists trained respectively in a more quantitative or positivist and a more qualitative 
or ethnographic style of research. The collaboration has been instructive: it has helped us 
recognize how different research methods point us towards different interpretive frameworks. 
The quantitative household survey provided a simple answer to the question of how food 
access differed between the new villages and a comparison community (“food security is 
lower in the comparison community”). The ethnographic work focused on the challenges that 
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villagization posed to livelihoods and well-being—components of the larger domain of which 
food security is a part. Ethnography not only provided a different answer to the question of 
what impact villagization has on food security, but forced us to reconsider the terms of the 
question: Can people be considered “food secure” when they are dependent on food aid for 
their survival? It also raised entirely new questions: Could people’s lives be said to have been 
improved, when well-being in their own terms has plummeted? And if people are not 
committed to living in planned settlements, and maintain home bases elsewhere in addition to 
the resettlement sites, can “villagization” be said to be happening at all?  
In the body of this paper we provide an account of how villagization in the lower 
Omo was conceived by the planners. We then describe the methods used to investigate how 
villagization was experienced by the affected population. We take particular care to explain 
the procedures involved in carrying out the household survey, since standard conventions of 
survey research are in some ways confounded by forms of social life in the lower Omo.  In 
the latter half of the paper we discuss the contrasting pictures that this research yielded.  
 
Villagization and Plantation Development in the Lower Omo: The Planners’ View  
  
In 2012, the South Omo Zone Agriculture Bureau produced a “Villagization Plan” which 
described how, in the course of the coming year, the majority of inhabitants of the zone—
some forty-five thousand people—would be moved into new villages (FDRE 2012). 
According to official documents, moving these people, referred to collectively as pastoralists, 
into new villages and introducing them to new farming methods would improve their lives. In 
the Plan the benefits of villagization are described as follows: (1) growing new crops, such as 
sugarcane, on irrigated fields would improve food security; (2) providing people with 
schooling and medical services would improve their health; (3) settling in planned villages 
would reduce conflicts that result from “mobility in search of water and pasture” (FDRE 
2012:5).  
As laid out in the Plan, the campaign would begin with community meetings at which 
the benefits of villagization would be explained, whereupon people would be assigned plots 
on which to build their new houses. At the same time as the sugar-cane plantations, 
processing factories, and new towns and villages were being built on land that was owned by 
the local communities, people would be issued with formal titles to both residential land and 
to farmland: “In the case of land that relies on rain [for cultivation] 2 hectares would be 
apportioned to each settler pastoralist, whereas those settling on irrigable land would be 
apportioned 0.5 hectares each” (ibid., p.8). They would also be provided with food aid “for 
about eight months, until the crop they plant in the first year reach for harvest [sic] and they 
could feed themselves” (p.18).  
The expansion of artificial irrigation in the lower Omo Valley was made possible by 
the construction of the Gibe III dam upstream, which began in 2008. In conjunction with the 
dam, a system of canals was built to distribute water to the Omo-Kuraz Sugar Plantation, 
within which selected plots of land were set aside for use by “settler pastoralists.” The Omo-
Kuraz Plantation is part of the Kuraz Sugar Development Project, a state-owned enterprise 
projected to cover 175,000 hectares (Ethiopian Sugar Corporation 2015). At full capacity, it 
was predicted, Kuraz would be responsible for fully a quarter of the country’s sugar and 
ethanol production, more than any other plantation in the country (Ethiopian Sugar 
Corporation 2014). In line with this vision, the Villagization Plan describes the overarching 
goal of the villagization project as to “change the economic and social condition of the 
pastoralists and make them out-growers for the sugar factory” (FDRE 2012:4).  
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Investigating the Bodi Experience of Villagization 
 
It is important to note that although the people who were targeted by the South Omo 
villagization program are frequently described as “pastoralists” by government officials (e.g., 
Meles 2011; Walta 2012), their diets were traditionally based mainly on farming of sorghum 
and maize, with dairy products providing an important supplementary component.2 In the 
more southerly parts of the lower Omo valley, there is ample floodplain on which to cultivate 
these crops; further north, people rely on a triad of livelihood strategies: herding, flood-retreat 
farming, and rain-fed agriculture (Turton 1985). This misconception about the livelihoods of 
the target population—the idea that, being pastoralists, they are unacquainted with 
agriculture—is widespread, and has had significant repercussions for the ways development 
is imagined by planners. 
Our study focused on the Me’en living on the eastern side of the Omo River, a 
segment of the larger Me’en ethno-linguistic group known to the Ethiopian authorities and 
outsiders as the Bodi, who on account of their location close to the Kuraz Sugar Development 
Project were the first people in the lower Omo to be targeted for villagization. 3 Numerically 
among the smaller ethno-linguistic groups of the region, the Bodi were estimated in the most 
recent census to number approximately 8,000 people (CSA 2008). According to the 
Villagization Plan, between 2012 and 2013, 1,430 households were to be resettled in three 
“new villages” in Bodi territory. (Assuming an average household size of five, this would 
represent more than 7,000 people.) Infrastructure for the villagization sites was first installed 
in 2012—schools, clinics, veterinary centers, and mill houses.  
It was not until planning was well under way that the government arranged public 
meetings to announce the villagization plan, and little effort was made to accommodate local 
ideas regarding the layout of the sites or the kinds of livelihoods that might be possible there. 
As Yidneckachew, who studied the public consultation process, observed, “the process was a 
nominal participation of pastoralists [sic]. . . . Discussions at the public forums were top-
down. . . . [The] facilitators determined and controlled the agenda, the alternative solutions, 
and the process of the consultation” (2015: 296, 300). The forums were orchestrated so as to 
permit the airing of “personal concerns about the project,” but did not afford the opportunity 
for any major challenge to the premises of the scheme. Rather than being open to all comers, 
participants in the forum were “called” up by the organizers based on their “proximity to the 
project command area.” According to a member of the Regional Steering Committee 
interviewed by Yidneckachew, “participants were not to represent any [particular] group or 
the pastoralists’ concern” (2015:296).  
Settlers began to arrive in May of 2012, and official data suggest that by September of 
that year a few dozen households were living in each of the villages. The principal “benefit” 
they received was an allocation of 30kg of grain per household per month as food aid. Land 
for irrigated farming was unavailable for approximately the first six months, but by early 
2013, agricultural extension agents (known locally as development agents) had begun 
directing the settlers to grow maize using an irrigation system provided by the Sugar 
Corporation. The promise of the planners was that by using new seed, fertilizer, and artificial 
irrigation, two or three harvests would be possible each year, with additional income 
available from selling cane to the Sugar Corporation for processing in the new factories.4 In 
practice, delays in the installation of infrastructure—both irrigation systems and the sugar 
factories—meant that these harvests were elusive. This was only one of the ways in which 
the experience of villagization failed to meet official expectations. Although people were at 
first given plots of 0.5 ha to cultivate maize for subsistence on irrigated plots, later the size of 
their plots was reduced to 0.25 ha. Once the processing factory was completed, the planners 
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suggested, people would be entitled to an extra 0.75 ha of land for sugar-cane cultivation, in 
addition to the 0.25 ha they were already cultivating.5  
We carried out our research both in villagization sites near Hana town (the 
administrative center of Salamago woreda) and in a comparison community in the division of 
Bodi territory called Gura.6 In the following section, we describe our research methods and 




To assess food access quantitatively, we used an adapted version of the Household Food 
Insecurity Access questionnaire (Swindale & Bilinsky 2006) which asks about household 
members’ experience of hunger and worry over food in the month before the survey. The 
questionnaire, developed by the Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance (FANTA) project 
of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), consists of nine questions, 
including, “In the past 30 days, did you: worry that your household would not have enough 
food? / eat fewer meals because of a shortage of food? / go to sleep hungry?” If respondents 
answered “Yes” to any of these questions, follow-up questions were asked, concerning the 
frequency within the past month with which these occurred (rarely, sometimes, or often). The 
resulting data are conventionally treated either as a continuous measure of food insecurity or 
used to categorize households as “food secure” (no “Yes” responses) or as “mildly, 
moderately, or severely food insecure.” “Moderate” food insecurity implies, for example, 
often having to consume foods you really don’t want to eat, or ever having to skip meals. 
“Severe” food insecurity implies such things as skipping meals frequently, having no food in 
the house, or going all day and night without eating (Coates et al. 2007). The survey also 
included questions about household demographics, water access, and assets.7 
Carrying out a household survey in the lower Omo involves various challenges that 
are often either absent or ignored in conventional accounts of survey research. First, Bodi is a 
largely non-literate society, yet to carry out a survey, the services of enumerators who were 
both literate and fluent in the local language, Me’en, were required. In an attempt to identify 
suitable enumerators, one of us (EGJS) put out word of the project in Hana town, and then, 
with the help of our collaborators, administered a short literacy test, in the shape of an 
application form, to the men who came forward. (All of the candidates were men.) We 
subsequently provided the six men who demonstrated themselves most literate in Amharic 
with a week’s training on the procedures of survey research in general and the project 
questionnaire in particular. The questionnaire was written and answers were recorded in 
Amharic, with translation into Me’en being carried out spontaneously by the enumerators. In 
principle it would have been better to print the questions and record answers in Me’en, but 
since that language is rarely written, it would have made the interview process much more 
difficult for the enumerators, while also increasing the likelihood of errors.8  
A second challenge was that survey research conventionally requires a sampling 
frame from which to select households for inclusion, yet civil registration systems barely 
function in the lower Omo, and official data on the population of the villagization sites 
proved unreliable. Government reports from early 2013 suggested that more than 800 
households had registered to resettle, but when we visited the villages in August 2013, there 
were altogether only about a hundred houses that were occupied in the three new villages.9 
We therefore attempted to survey all households in the new villages in which there were 
children under five years old. (We focused on households with children under five in order to 
assess children’s growth—another measure of nutritional sufficiency.) Of the approximately 
100 households present in the villagization sites, 59 included children under five, and all of 
these consented to participate in our survey.  
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 In Gura, the community that had not yet been subjected to villagization, we planned 
to survey an equivalent number of households to those we had covered in the existing 
resettlement sites. The social and physical organization of space among the Bodi is important 
for understanding the logic of sampling here. Bodi traditionally divide space into two types of 
settlements, each associated with a particular kind of food production: (1) cattle camps (ori, 
singular tuy) in the grasslands and (2) cultivation sites (kεrta, singular kεr) in the bush or by 
the river, where they practice either slash-and-burn agriculture or riverbank cultivation on 
land inundated by the annual rise of the Omo (Fukui 2001). These settlements differ in their 
layout and demographic composition. In the agricultural sites, women build temporary 
houses in small clusters, in immediate proximity to their fields. The women live in these 
settlements, known as olman, during most of the cultivation season, guarding their fields 
against pests. Men are more often found in the cattle camps (ori), where forage and water for 
cattle are available. Each cattle camp consists of a cluster of family compounds arranged in a 
U-shape around one or more shade trees under which the men habitually gather to socialize. 
(Young children move freely across these gendered spaces; as they grow older, they conform 
more to gender expectations.) Although such camps are sometimes located close to each 
other, overall they are widely scattered over the grassland. In August 2013, the people of 
Gura were residing principally in cattle camps, and the research sample in Gura was drawn 
from three such camps, which were judged by locals to be representative of Gura generally. 
Of the approximately 50 households present in these cattle camps, 39 included children under 
five, and all of these consented to participate in the survey. 
During administration of the survey in both Gura and the new villages, our team was 
accompanied at all times by a member of the Salamago woreda administration, who assisted 
in explaining the aims and procedures of our research to informants. We made an effort to 
explain to respondents the independence of our research from the activities of the 
government. However, the formal nature of the survey procedure, and the fact that a 
government employee was involved, may have identified us in the minds of respondents as 
complicit in the villagization program. This may have made some people reluctant to report 




In addition to the household survey, this paper also draws on four months of ethnographic 
research carried out by LB during three stays between 2012 and 2015—the years before and 
immediately after the villagization campaign in Hana—and on fieldnotes made by EGJS 
during the administration of the survey in 2013 and during a one-week visit in 2016. The 
primary focus of the ethnographic work was the communities of Gura, but we also carried out 
comparative work in the villagization sites and in Hana town.  
Our ethnographic research was based on spontaneous and opportunistic conversations 
(for LB primarily in Me’en, in which she is fluent, and for EGJS in Amharic and English) as 
well as on semi-structured interviews and observations. One difficulty of carrying out 
ethnographic research in the new villages was the obvious fear among people not closely 
acquainted with the ethnographers of voicing negative comments, in case they were reported 
to the authorities. Thanks to LB’s long-term presence, however, we were able to discern 
people who had been recruited by the local government as “representatives of the Bodi” and 
who had thus learned not to criticize government policies. Another strategy we adopted to 
improve rapport was to rely on friends who introduced us to trusted relatives living in the 
new villages.  
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Comparing Ethnographic and Survey Data on Food Security  
 
During the period of our research, Hana town was undergoing a transformation from a mere 
police post into an increasingly bustling town, and camps for full-time plantation workers, 
who numbered in the thousands, were springing up alongside the plantation. Both through 
informal labor migration and through planned resettlement, Salamago woreda as a whole was 
becoming increasingly ethnically diverse. Resettlement from Konso, a highland area of 
southern Ethiopia, had begun in the mid-2000s; and from 2012 increasing numbers of 
spontaneous migrants were also arriving from other parts of Ethiopia’s Southern region in 
search of work on the new plantations10 These newly-arrived migrants were especially visible 
in Hana town: in the mornings they lined the main street to await transportation by lorry to 
the plantation sites, and in the evenings they filled the restaurants and bars—businesses that 
themselves had been established only within the previous year. In the space of a decade, not 
only the Bodi but also the neighboring Mursi and other indigenous people of Salamago 
woreda had become minorities in their own lands. 
 Our survey provides a snapshot of food access conditions in the villagization sites and 
in Gura in August 2013 (Table 1). The food insecurity scale ranges from 0 to 27, with higher 
numbers representing more experiences of food insecurity (hunger, skipped meals, reduced 
dietary diversity, and worry over food) within the past month.  
 
Table 1: Food access in villagization sites near the Kuraz sugar plantation and in the 
cattle camps of Gura, in August 2013  
 






(receiving food aid) 7.8  5.1 52 
Gura cattle camps 
(not receiving food 
aid) 
11.6  5.0 39 
     
* Mean values are significantly different between the two sites (p <.05) 
 
Our initial hypothesis was that food security would be lower in villagization sites: that is to 
say that compared to Bodi communities not subject to villagization, households in the 
villagization sites would experience greater food insecurity. This prediction was based on a 
reading of the literature on the social impacts of resettlement, which demonstrates that 
relocation has more often deepened poverty than ameliorated it (Cernea 2000; Scudder 
2012).11 
The household survey data, however, do not support this hypothesis. Food insecurity 
was high in both of the study areas—85 percent of households in the villagization sites and 
97 percent of households in the Gura cattle camps reported experiences in the preceding 
month that reflect moderate or severe food insecurity according to conventional criteria 
(Coates et al. 2007)—but responses to the survey suggest that people in Gura experienced a 
degree of food insecurity significantly higher than those in the villagization sites.    
In interpreting these results, it is important to remember that at the time of the 
research, the government was distributing food aid only to people in the new villages. Our 
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ethnographic data also allow us to check the validity of the food security indicator against 
other aspects of context. How did the communities differ in terms of food access, beyond 
food aid? How did the people feel about their situation?  
 
Bodi Views of Food Security and Well-Being under Villagization 
 
As this was the first attempt at smallholder irrigated cultivation within the Kuraz Sugar 
Development Project, there was significant pressure on development agents to make it into a 
showcase for the success of the whole project. Once irrigated plots were made available in 
early 2013, development agents monitored the participants’ fields closely and held the Bodi 
accountable for any failure to bring the maize to maturity. This monitoring and nagging was 
resented by the Bodi, because crucial aspects of the farming—the size and location of plots, 
the type of seed, and the time of planting—were beyond their control. Settlers perceived 
themselves as occupying a lowly position in a command hierarchy, which grated with Bodi 
ideals of autonomy. As one settler told us: 
 
In the fields we cultivate ourselves with our sickle [the rain-fed fields], the fire eats 
everything and the weeds don’t grow fast. And if they grow, it’s only a little. People 
weed only for two or three days; if necessary we might weed for five days. We hold a 
working party with beer so we can finish it up quickly, and then we go back to our 
cattle and our children—we act like adults and live in peace, at home. But here, if the 
maize dries up, the Highlanders keep nagging you [as if you’re a child]: “Why hasn’t 
this person weeded his field? Why hasn’t that person brought water into his field?” 
(Man from one of the new villages, June 2014) 
  
The supply of water from the new irrigation system was also controlled by the Sugar 
Corporation. Some settlers found themselves in a position of advantage—those whose fields 
were closest to the canal received the water first when the canal gate was open, and could 
then block it so that the water entered their fields only. But crop yields from the irrigated 
fields were generally disappointing. Even when planting occurred during the rainy season 
and water was available from the canal—and the crops therefore received both rainwater and 
artificial irrigation—the resulting harvest was not enough to feed the settlers, let alone to 
produce a surplus for sale.  
 In addition to simple availability of food, a sense of well-being for the Bodi also 
includes the opportunity to consume—and share—food and drink in familiar ways. The 
physical arrangement of the new villages presented a key challenge here. The villagization 
sites, once they were established, bore little resemblance either to the clusters of houses 
found in cultivation sites (olman) or to the cattle camps (ori) that we described earlier. 
Although the new villages were supposed to gather several hundred households into more 
nucleated settlements, within these sites each household was positioned quite distant from the 
next—each on its own 0.5 hectare grid square—and in the allocation of plots to settlers, the 
local administration gave people little choice over either the location of their houses or whom 
they had as neighbors. These features of the new villages implied a very different set of 
routines and relationships than the ones the Bodi were accustomed to. When asked whether 
he shared his morning coffee with neighbors, a resident of a new village answered: 
 
Where can we share our coffee? There is no one you can call and say: “Come on, let’s 
drink coffee!” The way God made us is this: you are my neighbor, we get along well, 
so we build our compounds close to each other.12 God made us this way. But now the 
government comes and wants to turn us into Highlanders. Do our bodies know their 
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ways? They don’t. Now that we’re here, we cultivate the maize as they show us, and 
the maize ripens and we eat it, but our bodies feel bad (rɛ ɛ  ga k’ɛ si). (Man from 
one of the new villages, June 2014) 
 
 Bodily discomfort and social alienation emerged as key idioms for describing the 
disruptions and dislocations associated with villagization and plantation work. When one of 
us (LB) visited an irrigated field where women were weeding and asked them how they felt 
about the new conditions, at first some young women answered shyly that the government 
was arranging things well. But then an older woman spoke up: “Here, we are forced to live 
like serategna [Amharic: day-laborers]!” In their own fields, she went on to say, they had 
shade to rest in, and could make coffee; they enjoyed the comfort of their homes, and they 
mixed farm work with breaks drinking or socializing. But in the irrigated fields set aside for 
the settlers, which were approximately a half hour’s walk away from new villages, all the 
shade trees had been cut down. In order to get a little shelter from the sun, they had to spread 
clothes over the immature maize plants and then crowd into what little shade it afforded, to 
drink the beer of the working-party. From being a place to live and work, the fields had now 
become mainly a place of (hard) work.   
The heat, the sense of powerlessness, the meager harvests, and the harassment of the 
development agents made life hard for people in the villagization sites. Food aid provided by 
the government was the principal attraction. The following excerpt from an interview with a 
man from a cattle camp a few kilometers from Hana town provides insight into the 
motivations of many of the first people who registered as residents of the new villages.  
 
When the Highlanders [i.e., government agents] told us to move [into the new village], I 
went to build my house. My wives, they were hungry. I had no cattle to sell. So I said: 
“Let’s build a house and take some food [rations] from there.” And we built one. 
 
      [LB:] Did you just plant a few poles? 
I just planted a few poles [to mark the site] and I came back. Then I went to cultivate in 
the bush [to carry out rain-fed cultivation]. When my maize ripened, I left [the 
resettlement site]. (Man from a cattle camp near Hana town, 2012)  
 
This strategy of building a makeshift house at the villagization site in order to obtain 
rations seems to have been tried by many other families. Rather than representing a vote of 
confidence in the development plan, the principal reason for participating in the villagization 
campaign was in many cases to obtain food aid. Many of those who opted to settle before the 
irrigated fields were made available were struggling to support themselves—some, like the 
man quoted above, had few cattle, and could not therefore afford to sell any to buy grain; 
some had few able-bodied children, or elderly husbands. Others were relatively well-off, but 
wanted to take advantage of the food being distributed in the villagization sites.13 Similar to 
the case of villagization in central Ethiopia studied by Helen Pankhurst (1992), this initiative 
appears to have attracted a variety of people for a variety of reasons—some of them among 
the poorest and most desperate, and others who were more prosperous but saw an opportunity 
to profit from the situation.  
When we compare the experiences of the Bodi with other documented cases of 
resettlement, it becomes apparent that certain crucial aspects are due not so much to 
villagization as to the political and ecological changes that accompanied it: the fact that it was 
carried out at the same time as (1) a massive influx of labor migrants, which added to the 
almost decade-long presence of people deliberately resettled from Konso and (2) the 
ecological reengineering of the landscape to make it fit for plantation agriculture. In these 
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respects the situation in the lower Omo closely resembles developments in the Awash Valley 
in the 1960s and ’70s (Kloos 1982), and the combination of villagization and plantation 
development that has been carried out more recently in Ethiopia’s western province of 
Gambella (Fana 2016a, 2016b). In all three of these cases, a variety of forces undermined the 
livelihoods and food security of indigenous people at the same time as some of them were 
attempting to make a living in the resettlement sites. In the next section, we place our 
ethnographic findings in relationship to the work of other scholars of forced displacement and 
well-being, and we briefly consider the kinds of resistance the Bodi mounted to the changes 
that were forced upon them. Finally, we reflect on the implications of different research 
methods and interpretive frameworks for shedding light on these problems. 
 
Do Our Bodies Know Their Ways? 
 
We have highlighted in this study certain misconceptions on which villagization in the lower 
Omo has been based—(1) that the target population for resettlement were pastoralists 
unacquainted with agriculture, when in fact they were already reliant on farming for the 
majority of their diets; (2) that these individuals would enthusiastically embrace the 
opportunity to “settle” as soon as they were made aware of it, whereas in practice they 
viewed it skeptically; (3) that the resettlement sites would be more nucleated than places like 
Gura, whereas in important respects they were more spread out; and (4) that food security 
and well-being would inevitably be improved by these changes. We have shown that 
villagization was actually experienced by the Bodi settlers as undermining food security and 
diminishing well-being. It was experienced as heat, as disruption to routines, as a loss of 
control over livelihoods, as being treated like children rather than adults, and as abstracting 
work from ordinary sociality (see Carrier 2001). The question asked by one of our 
informants, “Do our bodies know their ways?” is emblematic of the profound disruption that 
many Bodi felt in the context of the upheaval that was forced upon them.  
Unpacking the words our informant used helps clarify some implications that are 
otherwise hazy. A literal translation of the phrase would be “Does the body/self know? It 
doesn’t.” Rɛ ɛ , which we have translated here as “body,” can also be understood as “self,” a 
double meaning that challenges the mind / body dichotomy in Western philosophy.14 
Students of the Mursi, culturally one of the Bodi’s closest neighbors, have analyzed the 
Mursi word for “body” and its relationship to local notions of selfhood. Eczet explains that 
the Mursi word ree denotes a general state of being, rather than the physical body as such—
hence the phrases “the body is good” or “the body is bad” refer to personal well-being or ill-
being 15 Furthermore, the “body” or “self” is intensified or strengthened through positive 
social interactions, when it is perceived by others (Eczet 2013:86; see also Lienhardt 
1985:155). Mursi and Bodi acknowledge that persons are made up of social relations; social 
interactions are therefore actively sought out (Fayers-Kerr 2013).  
 The opportunity to drink coffee with one’s friends in the morning—something that 
people missed in the new villages—may seem a banal thing, occurring as it does against the 
backdrop of land alienation and the upending of a political and ecological order that for the 
Bodi has deep cosmological significance (Buffavand 2016). But this practice is indicative of 
a set of meaningful routines that allow people to experience what is good in life, including 
connection with others. There’s a naturalness about these routines (“God made us this way”); 
when people are forced to abandon them, they suffer (“our bodies feel bad”) (see Weisner 
2009). In urban settings in Ethiopia, price spikes following the global financial crisis of 2008 
impacted on well-being in part because they made it hard for the poor to afford coffee, and 
precluded the social gatherings associated with coffee drinking (Hadley et al. 2012).16 
Freeman describes social gatherings for coffee drinking among the Gamo of the Ethiopian 
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south-west highlands as a “technique of happiness” which allows people to “subsume 
[themselves] in the social fabric” (2015:162, 171). The villagization scheme’s effective 
prohibition of such “techniques of happiness” can be seen as part of a continuum of violence 
inflicted on the Bodi and others in the name of development.17 Focusing only on the most 
obvious manifestations of this violence, such as the bulldozing of one’s backyard, can serve 
as a barrier to empathy for those of us who have little in our life experience to compare with 
this. Focusing on the denial of small freedoms, on the other hand, can help make larger 
injustices more comprehensible.  
 “To be resettled,” Oliver-Smith has written, “is one of the most acute expressions of 
powerlessness because it constitutes a loss of control over one’s physical space. The only 
thing left is . . . the body” (2010:14). The hunger and insecurity that our informants spoke of 
underline the fact that the body in question is vulnerable. If the set of routines and practices 
we rely on to make a living and to give life meaning—in short, our culture—is thought of as 
a second skin, then this is a body that has been stripped of that skin.  
 
Local Resistance, and Its Limits 
 
The sense of indignity and loss of control that we witnessed in the lower Omo are of a piece 
with what researchers of forced displacement have documented in many other places (Oliver-
Smith 2010). Another commonality is the ubiquity of resistance. One of the resources on 
which the Bodi have drawn in order to preserve a sense of dignity is their long experience of 
resistance to the projects of powerful outsiders (something they share with many other 
peoples of the Ethiopian periphery; see James 1979; González-Ruibal 2014). In the case of 
the resettlement campaign, this resistance took the form both of overt conflict and covert 
subversion. Open conflict occurred principally between the Bodi and immigrants from 
Konso, and mostly took the form of tit-for-tat killings. These conflicts began almost 
immediately upon the arrival of Konso settlers in the government resettlement drive in 2004. 
The government intervened in these cases by attempting to broker peace meetings. But with 
the region becoming newly critical to national development plans, the government installed a 
larger federal military presence in the woreda from 2012 onward. A denouement occurred in 
early 2014, when, after a new round of fighting had broken out between the Bodi and settlers 
from Konso, the Ethiopian military intervened on the side of Konso settlers, firing on Bodi 
who approached Konso settlements; according to Ethiopian Satellite Television the soldiers 
injured seventeen women, children, and youth (ESAT 2014). In the midst of this conflict, 
school teachers and other government workers left the new villages, as did most of the 
settlers who had been living there.  
Resistance to the government’s designs was more commonly of a covert kind: (1) 
refusing to show up to meetings, or to endorse the plans presented at them; (2) partial 
compliance, in the form of building new houses, laying claim to irrigated land, and receiving 
(and sometimes re-selling) food aid, and (3) adopting a bet-spreading strategy by trying out 
life in the new villages, while keeping one foot planted in their former homes. It also 
manifested in the porous nature of the resettlement sites, and the ways in which people 
moved back and forth between the new villages and cattle camps and rain-fed cultivation 
areas—treating the villagization sites not as their only homes, but as another node in their 
network.  
These resistance tactics work, however, only as long as other livelihood options 
remain open. As Scott has noted in his work on the “hill people” of Southeast Asia, grabbing 
of land and other resources by outsiders has diminished the power of techniques of resistance 
that for centuries helped people on the periphery maintain a degree of autonomy. 
Resettlement—the “transplantation” of “presumptively loyal and land-hungry valley 
 13 
populations” to the hills—has been a key strategy in the outsiders’ playbook (Scott 2009:xii). 
Another and complementary strategy has been to redesign the landscape, using engineering 
technologies that effectively turn the “hills” into “valleys”—or, in the Ethiopian case, 
technologies that make the lowlands useful for highlanders. We see all three of these 
strategies employed by the Ethiopian state and its corporate partners in the lower Omo, to the 
detriment of the indigenous people of the region. 
In some ways our research may have captured a moment when things were at their 
best for the Bodi in terms of engagement with the government’s designs: they were able to 
access food aid, but also to live without it. By 2016 these opportunities had narrowed. Filling 
of the reservoir behind the Gibe III dam, and the suspension of flows from the upper basin, 
led to the end of the seasonal flood in the lower Omo. The dam, and the diversion of water 
along newly-built canals, enabled the establishment of the Kuraz Sugar Development Project 
and private cotton estates, but effectively ruled out river-bank cultivation—a livelihood 
strategy that was crucial for an estimated ninety thousand people living along the banks of the 
Omo (Turton 2010). The option of opening up new fields by the riverside on which to grow 
sorghum, or clearing bush on which to grow maize, has been largely foreclosed to the Bodi 
and their neighbors, through processes that the planners did not undertake to explain.  
In 2016, Bodi families who for several years had been growing maize on plots set 
aside for settlers continued to farm there, but they recognized that this alone would not meet 
their needs, and many had fallen back on cultivation in rain-fed areas, which due to the end of 
river-bank cultivation had become newly crucial to their survival. Should the rains fail—not 
an unlikely scenario in this semi-arid region—famine would ensue, just as it did in the Awash 
in the 1970s (Kloos 1982). Moreover, since the Omo flood is vital not only for the livelihood 
systems of most of the people of southwest Ethiopia, but also for Lake Turkana and its 
fisheries, the dam and plantation schemes plausibly threaten the food security of all 
indigenous peoples of the lower Turkana basin, on both sides of the Ethiopia-Kenya border 
(Anonymous 2013; Avery 2013).18  
 
Bearing Witness to Development Forced Displacement 
 
In drawing attention to the potential of household survey research to hide, rather than expose, 
the essential features of this predicament, we are sounding a conclusion rather different from 
the conventional “More research is needed. . . .” The potential of research to represent 
faithfully the experience of those who are paying the costs of development cannot be taken 
for granted. In focusing only on the villagization piece of what is in fact a much wider set of 
interventions, our food access survey risks presenting a misleading picture. As we have 
shown, the survey results are best interpreted as showing that in both the villagization sites 
and the community of Gura, a majority of people were struggling to obtain enough food at 
the time of our research. Having carried out this survey, and having invested considerable 
effort in conforming as closely as possible to the conventions of quantitative social science 
research, we can make this claim with particular force. The weakness of the survey—and of 
cross-cultural surveys in general—is that, in pursuit of data that are widely comparable, it 
excludes important aspects of local context. As the designers of USAID’s household food 
insecurity questionnaires noted, “To develop a tool that is culturally invariant, some cultural 
specificity must be lost” (Deitchler et al. 2010:v). Or, as a cultural anthropologist might put 
it: the further your instruments travel, the less useful they are (Shweder et al. 2007).  
In the time that has elapsed since we carried out the research for this paper, multiple 
delegations from donor country agencies such as USAID and DFID have paid “fact-finding” 
visits to the lower Omo, only for their findings to be misreported or buried (Hurd 2013; 
Turton 2014). The testimony of the Bodi that we have placed at the center of this article is a 
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very small contribution towards redressing the debt owed by foreigners to some of the people 
who confided in them. It may be that the delegates from these agencies failed to report what 
they heard because it did not make sense to them: it did not square either with the official 
narrative of infrastructure development and improved service provision (the Ethiopian 
government’s narrative) or with the views of those critics who have focused on specific 
abuses, such as assaults and rapes committed by soldiers (e.g., Human Rights Watch 2012). 
The systematic forced displacement that the Bodi and Mursi have experienced has in fact 
occurred alongside the infrastructural development of which the government and the Sugar 
Corporation boast, and it raises more difficult political questions than does any isolated case 
of abuse. Household surveys, the standard means of generating evidence about human 
problems in the social sciences, are not well suited for investigating processes such as these. 
Unless surveys are accompanied by in-depth exploratory research, they risk overlooking the 
problem and merely reaffirming the preconceptions of the surveyors.   
Whether villagization is improving food security and well-being, it turns out, is not a 
very good question. It assumes certain things that, in the course of our research, we have 
come to recognize as problematic. Foremost among them is the assumption that villagization 
is a potentially positive alternative to a livelihood system that remains viable, although 
possibly less conducive to food security and well-being. In fact, the hydro-engineering 
schemes that make irrigated agriculture possible for settlers simultaneously undermine the 
possibility of making a living in the “traditional” way. From being expert stewards of their 
landscape, the Bodi and other peoples of the Omo-Turkana basin are being forced into the 
position of ignorant and vulnerable laborers, out of touch with the world around them (see 
Hobart 1993). A survey that compares villagization sites with other communities that have 
not been villagized, but does not take into account the broader context of resource alienation 
and massive manmade ecological change, will miss this crucial fact.  
By using ethnographic methods—by listening to the people on the front lines of this 
unfolding crisis, who oriented us towards the relationships between the villagization scheme 
and broader changes underway in the region—we managed to avoid giving too much 
credence to the results of the household survey. Spending extended periods of time in the 
lower Omo, and getting a feel for the dynamics of a culture that has quite successfully 
weathered past ecological and political changes through a combination of herding, flood-
retreat farming, and rain-fed agriculture, also helped us to see the limitations of the food 
insecurity questionnaire we employed. Food access at a given point in time (which, in spite 
of the scale’s name, is what the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale really measures) 
should not be taken as synonymous with the broader construct of food security, which 
implies risks to food access over the longer term. In actuality, there are few situations in 
which people are less food secure than when they are dependent on rations from a 
government or an aid agency, or than when the social and ecological systems on which they 
have relied for generations are being redesigned around them. 
On the basis of the principle, “You broke it, you fix it,” the moral responsibility for 
repairing the damage done to the livelihoods of the people of the lower Omo now rests with 
the Ethiopian government, its backers and collaborators—including Salini (the firm that 
designed the Gibe III dam), the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, and the lease-holders who are 
growing cotton for export on land appropriated, without compensation, from local 
communities. This will require something more than staking out irrigated plots of 0.25 or 0.5 
hectares per household, along with a promise that one day they may become outgrowers for 
the plantation. If analyses of the relative economic productivity of pastoralism and sugar 
production in the Awash serve as a guide (Behnke & Kerven 2013), a more equitable 
arrangement would be for the Sugar Corporation to hand over all profits from the plantation 
to the people from whom it has taken the land and water.  
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As we write, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn is inaugurating the 
Gibe III dam (Salini 2016). Downstream, the Bodi and their neighbors are hungrier and more 
desperate than they were before this €1.5 billion project began. In the years it would take for 
further research to be carried out and published, another dam might be built on the Omo, and 
thousands more people dispossessed and impoverished. Gibe IV is already under 
construction. For this reason, we urge our colleagues not only to consider the in-built 
distortions of some kinds of data collection, but also to make existing knowledge more 
widely available, and to assist in communicating what they know beyond academic circles.19 
One need only look to the extensive literature on “development-forced displacement” to see 
the parallels with the experience of the Afar and Oromo in the Awash, as well as with dozens 
of other cases where planned development has forced people into states of dependency. Such 
initiatives make possible increased security and well-being for some only at the cost of 
increased insecurity and suffering for others (Roy 1999). It is hard to escape the conclusion 
that in cases like these, famine is not the result of technical failures, but is rather the logical 
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1.    The current regime is the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, which 
has been in power since 1991. For a fuller listing of companies and state entities 
involved in dam and plantation development in the Lower Omo, see Kamski (2016).  
2.     Turton noted already in the 1970s for the neighboring Mursi people that cultivation 
‘clearly provides half of their daily subsistence’ (1979: 123). Although Mursi and 
Bodi in the early twenty-first century have more cattle on average than they had four 
decades ago, grain still constitutes the main part of their diet. 
3.     Interviews and ethnographic research for this study were carried out between 2012 
and 2016; the household survey was conducted in August-September 2013. 
4.     The seed used was a variety of hybrid maize (BH-140) developed by agricultural 
researchers in central Ethiopia (FDRE 2012; see Benti Tolessa et al. 1996, Abdisa et 
al. 2001). 
5.     As of this writing, the sugar factory is still not operational (Kamski 2016). 
6.     Woreda is an intermediate level in the official system of regional governance (kebele, 
woreda, zone, regional state, nation-state) 
7.     Ethical review for the study was carried out by the Health Bureau of the Southern 
Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region and by the Institutional Review Board of 
Emory University. 
8.     Missionaries working among highland Me’en have worked together with locals to 
translate sections of the New Testament and some school texts into Me’en, but the 
language is far from being established as a language of literacy, and among lowland 
Bodi (where our research was carried out) schools teach literacy in Amharic only. 
9.     Tewolde and Fana, who carried out research in the same year as we did, concurred 
that adoption of villagization site plots was significantly below government targets. In 
2013, they wrote, the largest of the villages had “less than one-third of the planned 
household units living in it” (Tewolde & Fana 2014:126). 
10.   In 2004, according to official figures, some three thousand households were relocated 
to Salamago woreda from Konso (Ayke 2005). 
11.   Cernea (2000: 20) describes some of the ways in which forced displacement can 
undermine food security: through receipt of inferior quality land, loss of access to 
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common property resources (such as grazing, wild foods, and water sources), or 
outright landlessness. 
12.   The Me’en word translated as ‘God’ is Tumo. This does not correspond precisely to 
the English ‘God’; ‘Divinity’ may be more appropriate (cf. Lienhardt 1961). ‘God’ is 
used here for the sake of intelligibility. 
13.   During the fieldwork for our household survey, for example, one of the enumerators 
whose relatives had taken up a plot in the settlement used our project automobile to 
transport bags of grain from the villagization site to town for resale—a practice that 
was officially prohibited, but to which the authorities turned a blind eye. 
14.  The work of Leenhardt is now a classic example of the relativity of the concept of 
‘body’. The missionary-cum-anthropologist was told by one of his Canaque students 
that the missionaries did not teach them the notion of the spirit, which they already 
knew, but that of the body (Leenhardt 1979: 164 in Graeber 2011: 243).	  
15.   This is also the case in the Dinka language, which ‘compels its speakers to integrate 
the moral and physical attributes of persons together within the physical matrix of the 
human body’ (Lienhardt, 1985: 150). 
16. On the importance of coffee drinking in Ethiopia more generally, and its social 
implications, see Pankhurst (1997), Sagawa (2006), Seeman (2015), and LaTosky 
(forthcoming). 
17. The idea of a continuum of violence is elaborated by Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 
(2004). 
18. Ecologists have predicted the end of the Omo flood brought about by the Gibe III dam 
will lead to a reduction of more than two-thirds in the yield of fisheries in the lake 
(Gownaris et al. 2017). 
19. At least three forums exist for this kind of exchange: Mursi Online (www.mursi.org), 
the Lands of the Future initiative (Abbink et al. 2014; www.eth.mpg.de/lof), and the 
Omo-Turkana Research Network (www.oturn.msu.edu). 
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